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Compromise Reaching Mechanisms 
in Multi-GrouplMulti-Player Negotiation Processes 
We consider a situation in which multiple decision-makers \?rho are partitioned 
into two or more distinct groups are asked to recommend a uniform course of 
action which is drawn from a finite and explicit set of potential alternatives. 
We present group-level and player-level mechanisms to reach a compromise 
decision under such circumstances. The group-level mechanism is based on 
the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence; The player-level mechanism employs 
a set-product operation that aggregates the individual decisions over a certain 
space of committees. Previous research established that the two mechanisms are 
isomorphic, which, in the contest of the present paper, implies that they yield 
the same compromise decision. However. unlilie the Dempster-Shafer theory, 
which was criticized for lack of esternal validity, the set-product mechanism 
has plausible properties in the contest of group decision making. With that in 
mind, the paper seeks to (i) report about an interesting relationship between 
group decision research and A1 methods to manage uncertainty, and (ii) build 
a foundation for an inter-disciplinary research that esploits this linkage. 
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1 Introduction 
# 
Negotiation is an iterative and interactive process in which two or more decision-makers, 
henceforth referred to as players, revise their initial decisions as they obtain new infor- 
mation and go through successive negotiation rounds. The process ends when all players 
decide to stick to their present decisions, which are then said to be final. Assuming that a 
consensus decision has not been reached, and that the group must select or recommend one 
course of action, there are two possible xvays to resolve the final stage of the negotiation 
process, The group can either choose one of the final decisions and forsake all others, in 
which case one player has 'won' the process, or it can seek a compromise decision that 
takes into consideration all the players7 final decisions, in one way or another. The latter 
strategy characterizes a cooperative group ~irhose "decision processes involve unitary tasks 
that usually require the combination of all group members' outputs into a single output" 
(Morrison, Morrison, & Vogel, 1992). Needless to say, such a compromise reaching mech- 
anism must be fair and plausible, or else some players xvill refuse to use it or abide to its 
outcome. Further, a mechanism that does not lend itself to a logical justification will make 
it difficult for the group to defend the compronlise decision if and when the need arises. 
Put figure 1 asound here 
The various stages of the decision process that we postulate are depicted in figure 1. Several 
methodologies and systems were developecl to support such cooperative group processes. 
For example, Bui (1987) has integrated a variety of methods, including an extended version 
of ELECTRE, Delphi and Nominal Group Techniques. and computer-based conferencing 
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and mediating tools, to create a decision support system for cooperative groups, called 
Co-op. By eliciting aspiration and reservation levels from group members, Lewandowski 
(1989) has calculated proxi importance weights which he then used to support cooperative 
committee decision making. These ideas were implemented in the SCDAS system, which 
also helps individual decision-makers to assess degrees of disagreement and distance from 
the aggregated group decision. It is important to emphasize at the outset that unlike these 
approaches, the present paper focuses only on the very last stage in the negotiation process 
- reaching a compromise - whereas the otller stages are mentioned here in order to put the 
paper's contribution in a proper perspective. In a nutshell, then, our objective is to describe 
a plausible mechanism for generating a group compro~nise decision. as the very last stage 
of an iterative and possibly long negotiation process. Further, we constraint our analysis 
to a subset of multi-player decision processes that have the following characteristics: 
1. All players face the same.eshaustive ancl mutually-exclusive set of alternatives, among 
which one or more alternatives must be chosen. 
2. Each player makes a decision by selecting a subset of alternatives. A singleton subset 
is interpreted as "the single alternative in the subset must be pursued," whereas non- 
singleton subsets are interpreted as "one of the alternatives in the subset must be 
pursued." At the final stage of the negotiation process (see figure I ) ,  each player is 
characterized by a single decision, i.e. a final suBset of alternatives. 
3. The players fall into different groups t11a.t a.re ~ha.~acterizecl by different objectives, 
constrains, affiliations, sources of eviclence, or any other property that serves to par- 
tition the players into distinct ca.tegories in a. non-ambiguous way. 
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Examples of decision settings that are consistent with the above assumptions abound in 
practice. For instance, the players can be physicians, executives, or professors. The set of 
possibilities can represent different diagnoses, products, or candidates for a dean position, 
respectively. The different groups into which the players fall can be medical specialties, 
business divisions, and academic departments, respectively. In each of these cases, it is 
assumed that a large group of decision-makers is asked to choose, or recommend, one or 
more courses of action out of many possibilities. The choice can be highly focused, as in 
"we should make an offer to this particular cancliclate," or it can be less committed, as in 
"we should develop either product -4 or product B." 
We see that the decision tasks that we focus on consist of discrete alternative problems - 
problems in which the players face an explicit and fised set of possible alternatives (Ziont's, 
1939). The players are not restricted to choosing a single alternative, though, making the 
process akin to Brams & Fishburn's (199'2) Approval Voting concept, in which members 
of a group can vote for as many candidates as they like in a multicandidate election. 
Other related research includes the \vork of Oral, Kettani, and Lang (1991), whose decision 
support methodology is designed to assist groups in selecting a subset from a finite list of . 
alternatives. 
Formally, we assume that a group of n players must select one or more alternatives from 
an exhaustive and mutually-exclusive set of alternatives, denoted 0. The players belong 
to m groups, denoted 91.. .g,, each consisting of 17, players, i = 1,. . . ,m, such that 
n = nl -t . . . n,. The m groups are characterizecl by different objectives and sources of 
information regarding 8. After evaluating the available information, each player selects 
independently a subset of 8 \\7hich, in his opinion. contains the best possible course of 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93- 14 
action. At that point, a negotiation process ensues, during which some players revise their 
initial decisions. When the process terminates. the group faces a set of n final individual 
decisions, or subsets of 8, from which a group decision must be selected. How can the group 
reach a compromise decision under such circumstances? For practical as well as analytic 
reasons, we divide the answer into two variants, which are depicted symbolically in figure 
2: 
Group-level compromise 
Individual-level compromise 
Put figure 2 a.round here 
The group-level mechanism (top of figure 3) assumes that each group conducts its delib- 
erations independently, producing a single group decision. That is, once the group delib- 
erations are over, the individual opinions of the group members are replaced with a single 
group decision which is broadcast to the other groups. at which point a negotiation round 
takes place. In the final stage of the process, a compromise reaching mechanism is applied 
to the final m group decisions, proclucillg a compromise decision. 
The individual-level mechanisnl (bottom of figure 2 )  assumes that the various players in- 
teract with each other directly ancl across group bounclaries, using a certain committees 
structure that will be discussed shortly. In the final stage of the negotiation process, a 
compromise reaching mechanism is applied to  the entire gamut of n individual decisions. 
Although the mechanism takes into consicleration the players' different group affiliations, 
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i t  operates over the larger space of individual, rather than group, decisions. One attractive 
feature of this mechanism is that individual opinions are tracked throughout the process, 
rather than replaced with group opinions, a process which entails a loss of information. 
Both compromise reaching mechanisms are subtly related to the Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence. This theory concerns the elicitation and manipulation of degrees of belief rendered 
by multiple sources of evidence to a common set of propositions. Recently, Hummel and 
Manevitz (1992) observed that the evidential reasoning that the Dempster-Shafer model 
attempts to manage is characterized by two types of uncertainty: intrinsic and extrinsic. 
In the context of the present paper. these correspond to the notions of players and groups, 
respectively. The source of intrinsic uncertainty is pluralism, or diversity of opinions: when 
two or more players are presented with the same information, the conclusions that they 
draw may well be different. In contrast, extrinsic uncertainty occurs because different 
groups, by virtue of their different affiliations, training. etc., may also lead to different 
conclusions. The Dempster-Shafer theory can be viewed as an attempt to manage both 
types of uncertainty simultaneousl\- - a point 11-hich is taken up later in the paper. 
The paper builds on previous work 011 uncertainty management in AI. The set-product 
mechanism that we describe was used by Hun~rnel & Lancly (198s) in their probabilistic 
analysis of Dempster's rule. This xsork was continued 1))- Hummel & Manevitz (1992), who 
extended it to  an axiomatic foundation for probabilistic reasoning in AI. On the applied 
side, Schocken Sr; Pyun (1990) presented a Dempster-Shafer relevance calculus with a multi- 
player semantics, where the players correspo~lclecl to searchers and catalogers of keyword- 
based information. This work was estenclecl considerably by Schocken & Hummel (1993), 
who used the multi-player semantics to  espose several limitations in the Dempster-Shafer 
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model and propose ways to resolve them. The present paper makes the first attempt to 
link this analytic work to the applied context of negotiations and group decision making - 
creating a bridge between two rather remote areas of research. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The nest section specifies the decision space from 
which players are asked to draw their individual decisions. This sets the stage for the next 
section, which describes several means to measure the intensity of those decisions. The next 
two sections describe group-level and indit-idual-level compromise reaching mechanisms. A 
discussion section concludes the paper ~vith implications and future research directions. 
2 The Decision Space 
Suppose that a group of stock market analysts is asked to predict tomorrow's stock market 
direction. To keep the example simple, ure take the set of alternatives (in this example - 
predictions) to be 6' = {up, same, down), representing the three mutually-exclusive proposi- 
tions "the market will go up more t h~ l z  5 poi~xt.~", .-the mn~;l;et will remain at today's index 
plus/minus 5 points", or "the ma!-kt uvill go doton more than 5 points". We define the de- 
cision space to be the power-set of Q ~ ~ l i n u s  the empty set, n-hich in this case is 2' = {{up), 
{same), {down), {up, same), {up, down). {same. down). (up, same, down)). 
Each element in the decision space 2' is a possible decision, which is interpreted as a 
disjunction of alternatives. Thus. an analyst \vould select the decision {up, same) if she 
believes that the market will either remain the same, or will go up (which is the same as 
saying "the market will not go douln"). wherea.s the decision (up) characterizes an analyst 
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who is not only more bullish, but also more confident in his prediction than the previous 
analyst. As a rule, since decisions are interpreted as disjunctions of alternatives, the smaller 
is the number of the disjuncts in a decision (viz: the cardinality of the subset), the higher is 
the confidence of the holder of that decision. Thus, singletons represent highly focused de- 
cisions, whereas 8 - the maximal element in 2' - represents the "least committed" decision. 
For example, the decision {up, same, down} stands for the vacuous forecast "the market will 
either go up, down, or remain the same" - a valid but obviously useless opinion. Actually 
the opinion is not completely useless, because it indicates that its holder was unable to 
make a more focused decision. If the player happens to be an experienced analyst, it might 
mean that more discerning information must be gatherecl before a reasoned prediction can 
be made. 
Also note in passing that even though the number of potential decisions in 2' grows expo- 
nentially with the cardinality of 0, the semantics of the decision process will usually render 
most of these decisions as non-sensical. For example. it might be argued that the decision 
{up,down} makes no sense in a market analysis scenario. in which case the decision can 
be eliminated from the decision space available to the analysts. In any given application, 
domain-specific arguments can be usecl to prune out numerous decisions (arbitrary subsets 
of 0) that imply inconsistent or other~vise unreasonable courses of action for the group, 
keeping the eflective decision space (set of options available to the players) much smaller 
than 2'. 
We conclude this section ~vith another example. in ~vhich 8 stands for a set of potential 
candidates for a job, and 2' represents different groupings of candidates. In this case, ele- 
ments of 2' can represent Hispanic canclidates. felllale candidates, candidates with Ph.D.'s, 
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candidates from Indianapolis, or simply the set of candidates Bill. Lisa, and Jane. In a 
typical hiring situation, different groups or players in the organizations will select different 
subsets from this power-set, and these decisions u~ill 'shrink7 and 'expand7 considerably as 
the negotiations process unfolds (similar to VanGundy7s (198s) characterization of con- 
vergent and divergent group decision processes). However, when all is said and done, the 
organization will have to make an offer to a single candidate, at which point a compromise 
reaching mechanism may be required. 
3 Decision Intensity Measures 
Having discussed the space from which individual decisions are 'drawn, we now turn to 
describe several means to estimate the degrees of supl>ort that such decisions gain in the 
group process. Let G be a group of 17 players, each making an individual decision by 
selecting a subset of alternatives from 8. \Ye talie the grozip decision to be a collection of 
pairs of the form: 
In each pair, X represents a particular decision (a subset of 8), and the rn parameter that 
accompanies it represents the intensity of that decision. which varies from 0 to 1. Thus, 
the intensity is essentially a mapping 172 : 2% -+ [0.1] and the m values mentioned in (1) 
are shorthand for rn(X). We deliberately leave the semantics of intensity at a somewhat 
abstract level, because different applications can call for different definitions which will then 
require different intensity calculi. Ho~sever, it is quite natural to besin with a probabilistic 
interpretation of intensity - either subjective or frecluentist. .A subjective interpretation 
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views m(X)  values as degrees of support that vary from 0 (X is an impossible decision) to 1 
( X  is an inevitable decision). A frequentist interpretation can vier\? m.(.) as some statistic of 
the spread of decisions within the group. In particular. we consider the following definition 
of m : 2e -4 [O, 13: 
#X/l2 X i 0  
m ( X )  = { 0 s = 0 
where #A' i s  the tzumbe~. of players ii? t h e  group I C ~ O S E :  clecision is  X 
Under this interpretation, in(,"i') is the fraction of the players in the group whose individual 
decisions were X. This fraction can serve as an estimate of the probability that a player 
who is randomly sampled from that group will hold the decision -Y. 
Of particular interest is the intensit;- of the Yacuous clecision - mj6). i.e. the fraction of 
players whose decision was "choose any one of the available alternatiw!~." This value can 
be viewed as a first-order measure of a group's inclecisi\-eness. For example, if m(8) = 1, 
not even one player in the group was willing to make a concrete decision. On the other 
extreme, m(0) = 0 characterizes a group in whicl~ all players made decisions that had at  
least some discerning power. The distinction is a bit tricky because even though m(8) = 1 
represents a strictly indecisive group, nz(B) = 0 does not necessarily imply a decisive group. 
For example, let 6 = (Nicks, Bulls, Suns, ~ o n i c s ) ,  and suppose that at the beginning of 
the NBA playoff a group of sports writers decides unanimously that this year's champion will 
be either the Nicks, the Bulls, or the Suns. The group will he characterized by m(8) = 0, 
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but it  is hardly decisive; For that reason, we view 172(Lq) as merely a first-order measure of 
group indecisiveness. 
Returning to  our stock market example, where 8 = (up, same, down), consider a research 
analysts group which is required to produce a buy/sell/hold recommendation for the com- 
pany's stockbrokers regarding, say, investments in index-based securities. We assume that 
the group consists of eight analysts. which, for the sake or future reference, are referred 
to it as group number 1. Suppose that the group dynamics were such that four players 
predict that the market will remain more or less the same, one player predicts that the 
market will go down, two players predict that the market will either remain the same or 
will go down, and one player refuses to commit himself to any concrete prediction. Using 
(3), group number 1 will be characterized by the following In(.) function: 
?721(same) = 418 
~n~(down)  = 118 
ml{same, down) = 218 
172~419) = 118 
Now, taken as support function, m ( S )  is kind of b~hollow," because it measures only the 
fraction of players whose decision was e:rnctly X. Recalling that S represents a disjunction 
of alternatives, e.g. up V same, it. is rea.sona.ble to argue that players who made more 
focused decisions like up or same (as singletons) provide indirect support to up v same as 
well. Likewise, it can be argued t.hat players whose decision was 'I; where X n I' f 4) also 
~rovide  a potential support to X. For example, if -y = {up,same) and Y = (same,down)', 
players who decide Y essentially say that they ca.nnot discriminate between same and down, 
'We intentionally use the proposition a V  b and the subset {a.b) interchangeably, to remind the reader 
that the former is the semantic interpretation of the latter. 
10 
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i.e., that  their support floats someu-here in the subset Y, but that they cannot specify 
exactly where. In the extreme case, the players' support can concentrate exclusively on 
the  alternative same, in which case they also end up supporting (indirectly) the decision 
X = {up,same). 
Hence, we see that using the function m(.) a.s ra.w input, we can compute some 'high- 
level' measures of support. In particular, in addition to tracking the fraction of players 
who decided X exactly (that is what 117(.) does), nre wish to track the fraction of players 
whose decisions were subsumed by X, and the fraction of players whose decisions overlap 
X .  These two measures are denoted Bel(.T7) ancl P l ( S ) ,  respectively, and are defined as 
follows: 
In words, the Bel(X) function measures the totul st~pport that ,X- has received from the 
group, whereas Pl(X) measures the upper-bouncl of that f~~nc t ion .  In the case of the 
support function given by (3). definitions (-1) ancl (5) yielcl the following measures: 
Bell(same) = 4/S 
Bell(down) = 1/S 
Bell{same, down) = 3/S + 4/S + l / S  = 7/S 
Bell(0) = l / S + 4 / S + l / S + 2 / S  = 1 
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Pll(same) = 4/S + 2/S + 113 = 718 
PI1 (down) = 1/S + 2/S + 1/3 = 418 
Pll(same, down) = 2/S + 4/S + 118 + 1/S = 1 
Pll(8) = l /S  + 4/S + l /S  + 218 = 1 
Readers who are familiar with the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence have probably rec- 
ognized m(X), Bel(X), and PI(X) as the theory's mass, belief, and plausibility functions, 
respectively. The novel aspect of the present analysis is that it uses a plausible semantics 
- the multi-player decision setting - to justify these functions by construction. Note that 
since Bel(X) and Pl(X) are completely defined in terins of r n ( X ) .  it is sufficient to continue 
the analysis by focusing only on the latter f~ulction. 
4 Group-level Compromise 
The stock market example was based on the assuinption that all the research analysts 
were members of a homogeneous group. In realit.y, this is rarely the ca.se. For example, it 
might be that different groups of analysts have access to different sources of information 
- a situation which occurs frequently in 'IVall Street. Specifically, let us assume that our 
second group of analysts consists of five players. of 1.i-Bom two think that the market will 
either go up or remain the same, while three thiilk that the nlarket \\rill either go down or 
remain the same. 
Using definition (3)' the decision of group number 2 is cl~a.racterized by: 
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na2(up, same) = 2 / 5  
17z2( same, down) = :3/5 
To recapitulate, we now have two groups of analysts who try to predict the market's 
direction. In both groups, all the players draw their decisions from the common set of 
possibilities 8 = {up, same, down). After deliberating their decisions within each group, 
two group decisions emerge, as given by (3) and (S). Taken as a whole, however, the two 
groups of analysts must endorse a single prediction. or recomn~endation, which will then be 
broadcast to  the company's brokers. What shoulcl the research analj~sts do? At the group 
level, they can either adopt one group decision ancl ignore the other, or they can seek a 
compromise decision, i.e., a decision that takes both groups into consideration. 
One can think of many different mechanisms to reach such a compromise. For example, the 
two groups can be simply collapsecl together, ancl the combined group of 8+5=13 analysts 
can use (3) to compute their pooled decision. However, such a mechanism will be quite 
naive, because (i) i t  will not utilize the group differences; and (ii) it will not allow the 
groups t o  interact in any meaningful way. Hence. a more sophisticated mechanism is called 
for. One such mechanism is available in the form of Dempster's rule, which can be used 
to combine m(-) functions that come from different sources. Formally, Dempster's rule 
computes a pooled mass function 171 = m, $ rn? : 2' -t [0,1] as follows: 
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In words, (9 )  computes the overall support that a subset X collects by summing up the 
products m l ( A )  - m 2 ( B )  over all the subsets A. B E 2"whose intersection gives X. One 
adverse side-effect of this computation is that the pooled group decision can contain the 
result mt(0) > 0, which is disallo\vecl by m's definition (3). This anomaly is corrected by 
(lo), which normalizes m t ( X )  in such a way that m(0)  becomes 0 by definition and all 
the other m ( X )  for X # 0 sum up to 1. The need for this manipulation can be justified 
by our multi-player semantics. ~vhich views n?(-X-) as the fraction of players whose decision 
was X .  Recalling that the players were not allowecl tso choose the decision 0,  we see that 
m(0)  must be 0 by definition. Therefore, if we wish the ??I(-) functions defined by (3) to be 
closed under Dempster's rule, we must normalize them accordingly. 
To illustrate the operation of Dempster's rule in the contest of our stock market analysis, 
consider its application to the group decisions describecl by (3) and (8). The computation 
is illustrated through an intersection table. follo~ving Sllafer (1976): 
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m~(same, down) = 315 
ml(same) = 12/40 ma(same) = 4/23 
m2(down) = 1/23 
mz(same7 down) = 2/S 
mf(same) = 8/40 + 12/40 + 4/10 = 24/10, 
ml(down) = 3/40, 
m1(same7 down) = 6/40 + 3/40 = 9/40, 
m1(up7 same) = 2/40, 
ml(0)  = 2/40. 
1?2~(up, same) = 2/5 
ml(same) = S/40 
m2(8) = 118 
And, after multiplying by -m (0) = 20/19: 
m1(8) = 2/40 
nzl(same) = 4/40 
m(same) = 24/40 . '20/19 = 24/38. 
m(down) = 13/40 20119 = 3/38, 
m(same, down) = 9/40 . 20/19 = 9/38. 
m(up, same) = 2/40 - 20119 = 2/38, 
m ( 0 )  = 0. 
mf(down) = 3/40 
nzl(same. down) = 6 /40  
I ? ~ / ( u P ,  same) = 2/40 
Verbally, the  compromise decision call be stated as follo\vs: "after reviewing the market 
conditions, our research annlysts beliere quite strongly that tomorro~u'.~ market will either 
remain the same or will go down. Recommendafion: .sfny foot". 
n?I(same. down) = 3/40 
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Note that (9-10)  is commutative and associative. Hence, the formulae can be used to reach 
a compromise decision among more than two groups, in any desired order. Therefore, the 
compromise reaching mechanism can be applied in a cumulative fashion, accommodating 
new group decisions as they become available. In spite of these desired properties, though, 
Dempster's rule is considered a highly controversial operator, and many have tried to justify 
it on mathematical as well as on cognitive grounds (Baron, 1987, Kyburg, 1987, Lindley, 
1987, Schocken and Mleindorfer, 19S9, and Zadeh, 1986 - to give only a few representative 
examples of this line of research). As 1ve will see shortly. one advantage of the multi-player 
semantics is that unlike the above interpretations, is can be used to justify Dempster's rule 
in a remarkably intuitive and simple \\-a\.-. in the contest of certain applications. 
5 Individual-level Compromise 
The previous section described a gl*oup-level compromise mechanism. In that scenario, 
each group deliberated independently to produce a group decision, and the group decisions 
were then combined to produce a g-tobal compromise. This section describes a player-level 
compromise mechanism that operates 01-er the individual decisions of the group members, 
rather than over the summarized group clecisions. The two mechanisms have a rather 
different dynamics, but as we will see later they are tightly interrelated. 
We continue with our stock market example and the same groups of analysts described in 
the previous section. .4s we assunled before, each player is presented with the same set 
of possibilities 8 = {up, same, down). However. we now add a subtle twist to  the decision 
elicitation process. Insteacl of aslii~lg the players to .select subsets of 'good,' or 'likely,' 
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alternatives from 8, we ask them to rule out subsets of 'bad,' or 'unlikely,' alternatives. 
Two restrictions are placed on the players's decisions. First, they must rule out alternatives 
categorically. Second, the players are not allowecl to rule out all the alternatives. 
For notational convenience, we represent each individual decision as a binary vector in 
which 0 codes that the respective alternative has been ruled out by the player and 1 
otherwise. For example, given that 8 = (up, same, down), the decision (O,1,1) codes that 
the up direction has been ruled out by the player, implying the player's opinion that the 
market will either remain the same. or will go down. Since the player's decision must imply 
a t  least one 'good' alternative, the decision (8,O.O) is disallowed, and the state of insufficient 
reason, or total ignorance, is modeled by the decision (1,1,1). This particular decision is 
consistent with a player who is unable to rule out any alternative. 
With this notation, the individual decisions of the players in group numbers 1 and 2 of 
the previous section are tabulated at the left side of figure 3. As the tables indicate, in 
the first group four analysts rule out up and down, one analyst rules out up and same, two 
analysts rule out up, and one analyst rules out no alternatives. Similarly, in the second 
group two analysts rule out down and three analysts rule out up. Given that all players 
announce their decisions as final, how can we reach a compromise decision that takes all 
the individual decisions into consicleration? 
As in the group-level case, one call think of a variety of such multi-player compromise 
reaching mechanisms. The mechanis~l~s will differ in terms of players matching rules and 
decision combination operators, but their overall goal \\rill be the same: reducing a multi- 
tude of possibly conflicting and reclunclant decisions into a uniform group decision. As a 
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rule, though, we believe that the only mechanisms which are worth researching are those 
that have (i) a solid normative justification, and (ii) a practical face validity. Figure 1 
illustrates the operation of one such mechanism, the .set-product model - which is based 
on Hummel & Landy's (1988) probabilistic interpretation of Dempster's rule. This sim- 
ple model can be viewed as a point of departure to~vards developing more sophisticated 
mechanisms that can be customizecl for different. group decision situations. 
Put figure 3 a.souncl here 
The set-product mechanism implements what may be termed a cartesinn consensus oper- 
ation. First, one constructs all the committees of t ~ - o  that can be formed by matching 
each analyst from the first group 11-it11 each analyst from the second group. In the above 
example, there are S x 5 = 40 such pairs of analysts. The decision of each committee is 
then taken to be the Boolean conjunction of the decisions of the committee's members. 
For example, the two group 1 analysts whose individual decisions were (O,1,1) and the 
two group 2 analysts whose individual clecisiolls were (1,1,0) yield four committees whose 
joint decision is (0,1,0) - the fifth tuple in the set-product table. Since the only thing that 
distinguishes one committee from another (in this particular model) is the committee's 
joint opinion, the committees that have iclentical opinions are collated, leading to the third 
column in figure 3. Finally, note that the Boolean conjunction of d i d  decisions may well 
generate an invalid decision, which happens ~vhenever the operator produces vectors of the 
form (0,0,0). This is an anomaly, since null decisions are disallo~ved in our model. One 
way to  resolve the problem is to simply disregard all the committees that produced null 
decisions, leading to the right-most and final table in figure 3. 
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The set-product compromise mechanism is of special interest to us because of its unique 
relationship t o  the Dempster-Shafer model. Specifically, we have already pointed out that 
the two left-most tables in figure 3 induce the mass functions ml and mz, as given earlier 
in the paper in (3) and (8). -4s the reader can verify, the right-most table in figure 3 - the 
normalized outcome of the set-product operation on the above two tables - induces the 
mass function m = ml ernz given by (12), where B stands for the standard Dempster rule. 
This is no coincidence: if we denote the mass function that captures a set of decisions in a 
group G by mG, the set-product conlpromise mechanism by @, and Dempster's rule by @, 
- we have the following isomorpl~ism: 317 oG, - 1 7 1 ~ ~  @ 137 G2. 
6 Discussion 
Proofs of the isomorphism result given above can be found in Hummel and Landy (1988), 
where i t  was established in the contest of a general probal~ilistic analysis, and in Schocken 
and Hummel (1992), where it was established in the applied setting of an information 
indexing and retrieval application. As the previous section illustrated, the isomorphism is 
particularly compelling in the present contest of a multi-player decision process: unlike the 
rather cryptic Dempster-Shafer moclel - which is normally justified on the basis of heuristic 
grounds - the components of the multi-player model are straightforward, intuitive, and most 
importantly - explicit. Further, the set-product mechanism has several desired properties 
in the context of group decision making. 
First, recall that the compromise reaching mechanism that we sought was supposed t o  
combine individual decisions that are dra.wn from two distinct groups consisting of equally- 
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qualified players (this restriction can be lifted, leading to weighted versions of our com- 
promise calculus). Thus, we had assumed that each and every one of the players in both 
groups was supposed to influence the compromise decision with the same impact. Under 
such circumstances, the set-product mechanism provides the largest possible set of pairings 
of players; any other combination scheme will restrict the set of pairings based on some ad- 
ditional structure which was not part of our original assumptions. Further, the set-product 
mechanism has the following advantages: 
It is commutative, treating each group of players on an equal basis; 
It is associative, so that the order and precedence of the compromise reaching process 
have no influence on I he final outcome: 
Each player in each group has a.n equal role, and is not thwarted by pairing with an 
unrepresentative set of players from other groups; 
The Boolean conjunction operator that is used to produce the decision of each com- 
mittee is plausible, because it. rules out the decisions that were ruled out by both 
members of the commit tee. 
To conclude, the contribution of this paper can be seen from two different perspectives 
- that of the Dempster-Shafer model, and that of multi-player negotiations theories. Be- 
ginning with the former perspective, we observe that the set-product mechanism, along 
with the isomorphism result, imply that the Dempster-Sllafer model can be viewed and 
justified as a means to resolve different decisions expressed by domain experts that are 
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partitioned into different groups. From a negotiations research perspective, we have pre- 
sented a particular compromise reaching mechanism which happens to be isomorphic to 
the Dempster-Shafer model. 
This reservation is quite important, because different assumptions about the nature of the 
negotiation process may require different ways to summarize and combine the decisions of 
the individual players. For example, the players may be given different weights, the individ- 
ual decisions can be allowed to be probabilistic rather than Boolean, and the committees 
structure can be altered or constraillecl in many different ways. In general. one can envision 
a whole parametric gamut of multi-player/mt1lti-grot11~ colnpromise reaching mechanisms, 
of which the Dempster-Shafer model is merely one special instance. In particular, the dif- 
ferent objectives of the various groups - an important consideration which was not part of 
the present analysis - should be taken into consideration in formulating such mechanisms. 
This would entail an ambitious research progra~n that integrates two rather remote areas 
of research - group decision theory. on the one hand. and AI-based methods to manage 
uncertainty, on the other. We hope that this paper provides the first step in that direction. 
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Figure 1: The various stages of a cooperative group negotiations process 
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Figure 2: Group-level (top) and inclil-iclual-level (hot.t.om) compromise reaching mecha- 
nisms. 
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Figure 3: The set-product comproillise reaching n~ecl~a.nism and its various stages 
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